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Abstract 
Based on a synthetic literature review, the present article summarizes the main characteristics 
of  the  Eurozone  institutional  setup  and  the  related  economic  and  political  incentives  that  drive 
Eurozone governments to increase their public debts, disregarding the limits agreed in the European 
treatises. We propose a theoretical and qualitative approach, taking into account the general features 
and the nature of Eurozone institutional setup. The second and third part of the paper contains a review 
of the Eurozone institutional setup and its role in sovereign debt problem of Euro area while the fourth 
part of the paper carries out a concise analysis of some proposed strategies and policy tools to fight 
Eurozone debt problem: ECB bond buying, EFSF/ESM leverage, Eurobonds and Euro-TARP. 
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Introduction 
Real insight regarding the Eurozone public debt crisis can be acquired analyzing the 
underlying institutional setup of Euro area and the incentives it creates for the member states’ 
governments  to  increase  their  deficit  spending.  Explicit  rules  specified  in  the  Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) require limits of government budget deficits 
and public debts (3% of GDP budget deficit and 60% of GDP public debt). The history of 
breaches of Maastricht Treaty and SGP indicate that all these formal requirements proved 
powerless to curb the Eurozone governments’ incentives of incurring in excessive deficits and 
debts. Moreover, although Maastricht Treaty contains an explicit “no-bailout” clause that was 
designed to  prevent Eurozone countries  from  being  liable  for the debts  of other member 
states
1, nevertheless the “no-bailout” clause was ignored in the case of Greece bailout and also 
in case of other countries of Eurozone that received financial assistance in the context of 
Eurozone debt crisis.  
Most of the solutions suggested and supported currently in EU to counter the effects of 
the Eurozone debt crisis imply increased centralization at the EU level – in terms of fiscal 
union, banking union and even political union. Although the implementation of a fiscal union 
in the Euro area is presented as a way to save the euro and to overcome the sovereign debt 
crisis, nonetheless there are no reasons to believe that the debt problem of Euro area will be 
solved  as  long  as  the  socialization  of  risks  and  losses  across  Eurozone  remain  possible. 
Historical studies suggest that the “no bailout” clause is crucial for well-functioning fiscal 
unions or federations.  For example, Bordo, Jonung and Markiewicz studied five historical 
cases of fiscal unions or federations and concluded that “fiscal discipline has been obtained 
through several techniques: explicit or implicit no-bailout clauses, constitutional restrictions, 
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and  discipline  exercised  by  financial  markets  for  government  debt”.  They  explained  that 
“without a strict and credible no-bail out clause, the financial market mechanism is likely to 
fail as an efficient disciplining device on fiscal policy” (Bordo, Jonung & Markiewicz, 2011). 
In spite of this, the advocates of the fiscal union in EU propose additional strategies and 
mechanisms  of socialization of risks  and losses across  Eurozone  countries,  weakening or 
canceling the effect that market discipline naturally impose on banks, governments or other 
agents. 
The main idea defended in this article is that reckless disregard of the formal rules 
concerning  public  debts  limits  showed  by  some  of  the  Eurozone  member  states  is  close 
related to the underlying institutional setup of the Eurozone. Credible commitment to a “no 
bailout” clause and real compliance with Maastricht Treaty and SGP conditions require a 
match between the underlying institutional setup of Eurozone and the formal requirements 
regarding debts limit. Consequently, the first step in solving Eurozone debt problem must 
consists  in  dismantling  all  the  mechanism  of  debt  rollover  and  also  in  cutting  off  the 
socialization of risks and losses across Euro area. 
Based  on  a  synthetic  literature  review,  the  present  article  summarizes  the  main 
characteristics  of  the  Eurozone  institutional  setup  and  the  related  economic  and  political 
incentives that drive Eurozone governments to increase their public debts, disregarding the 
limits agreed in the European treatises. We propose a theoretical and qualitative approach, 
taking into account the general features and the nature of Eurozone institutional setup. The 
first and second part of the paper contains a review of the Eurozone institutional setup and its 
role in sovereign debt problem of Euro area while the third part of the paper carries out a 
concise analysis of some proposed strategies and policy tools to fight Eurozone debt problem: 
ECB bond buying, EFSF/ESM leverage, Eurobonds and Euro-TARP. 
 
1. The  Underlying  Institutional  Setup  of  the  Eurozone  and  Sovereign  Debt 
Problems of the Member States  
In order to explain and identify the incentives of Eurozone governments to increase 
government deficits and public debts over the agreed limits of Maastricht Treaty or SGP, 
Philipp Bagus used the concept of the tragedy of commons – coined by Garrett Hardin – and 
conceived  it  as  a  special  case  of  the  external  costs  problem.
1  As  Ph.  Bagus  analysis 
demonstrates, this concept of the tragedy of commons can be successfully applied in order to 
explain the external costs arising from the fact that the institutional setup of the Eurosystem in 
the EMU is such that all Eurozone governments can use the ECB to finance their deficits. 
How exactly these external costs arise, given the institutional setup of Eurozone? It is 
a common practice for governments to issue bonds when spending is greater than tax revenue. 
Government bonds are usually bought by banks, given the fact that the central banks accept 
them as collateral for loans to the banking system. Thus, banks’ purchases of government 
bonds enable them to expand credit on their turn and also to buy further new government 
bonds. In a fractional reserve banking systems, the concrete result of this practice is a process 
of bank credit creation that is directed toward crediting governments. Moreover, beyond this 
common practice in contemporary economies, there is the peculiar characteristic of Eurozone 
institutional  setup:  one  currency  and  many  fiscal  authorities.  Technically,  under  such 
institutional  setup,  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  can  finance  the  deficits  of  Eurozone 
governments  either  directly  by  buying  government  bonds  or  indirectly  accepting  them  as 
collateral for loans to the Eurozone banking system. The first route (ECB bond buying) was 
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not commonly used but it was only exceptionally admitted during the Eurozone debt crisis
1. 
The second route of financing Eurozone government deficits via ECB is more subtle and it is 
commonly  used  by  Eurozone  governments,  given  the  ECB  and  national  central  banks 
acceptance of Eurozone government bonds as collateral for loans.  
Therefore, given the practice of fractional reserve banking and bank credit creation 
and also, given the peculiar institutional setup of Eurozone, the costs of increasing the deficit 
in one of the Eurozone countries is undertaken by all users of euro currency in the form of 
reduced purchasing power of the monetary unit. In conclusion the costs of increasing deficits 
and public debts in one of the Eurozone countries can be externalized and consequently there 
are clear incentives for Eurozone governments to permanently increase their deficits, as the 
cost of this increase is supported by all other countries using euro
2: 
 
“The tragedy of the Euro is the incentive to incur higher deficits, issue government 
bonds, and make the whole Euro group burden the costs of irresponsible policies—in 
the  form  of  the  lower  purchasing  power  of  the  Euro.[…]  With  such  incentives, 
politicians  tend  to  run  high  deficits.  Why  pay  for  higher  expenditures  by  raising 
unpopular taxes? Why not just issue bonds that will be purchased by the creation of 
new money, even if it ultimately increases prices in the whole of the EMU? Why not 
externalize the costs of government spending?” (Bagus 2010, p. 91) 
 
The  tragedy  of  commons  is  a  concept  or  model  employed  to  explain  cooperation 
failures in situations when agents can externalize costs and retain benefits of their actions. 
Moral hazard is another concept that approximates more or less the same type of problem: it 
refers to the tendency that one may have to take more risks given the fact that the costs of his 
action will not be endured by the ones who assumed the risks
3. For example, the Eurozone 
governments may be prone to take more risks (increasing their deficit spending) than they 
would normally take if the related economic and social costs were incurred only by high 
deficits countries. Both approaches  – i.e. tragedy of commons and moral hazard – have in 
common the fact that they take into account the incentives of agents involved. 
It is worth noting that ideal cases of tragedy of commons or moral hazard described in 
theory may not be encountered in real life situations. For example, in the case of Eurozone 
government’s high deficits problem there are several possible limitations on the incentives to 
increase deficits. Ph. Bagus identified six such possible limitations that may be encountered in 
practice: (1) banks may not buy government bonds and use them as collateral if interest rate 
offered for the government bonds are not high enough in comparison with the interest rates 
they  pay  for  loans  from  the  ECB;  (2)  the  default  risk  on  governments  bonds  may  also 
determine banks to act prudently; (3) the ECB may require a minimum rating for banks to be 
accepted as collateral; (4) the liquidity risk involved for banks using the ECB to refinance 
themselves by pledging government bonds as collateral; (5) haircuts applied by the ECB on 
the collateral that not allow for full refinancing; (6) the fact that ECB may not accommodate 
all demands for new loans for banks. (Bagus 2010, pp. 88-90) 
The fact that the entire process of financing government deficits took place indirectly 
through the banking system explains indeed why the Eurozone government “borrowing race” 
encountered limits. But at the same time, a tendency to bypass or neutralize such limits may 
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be observed. First, highly indebt countries benefitted from the implicit guaranties of more 
sound countries when joined Eurozone and consequently buyers of debt securities considered 
the risk of default on governments bonds to be insignificant. Countries like Greece and Italy – 
which had high public debts when they joined Eurozone (over 60% debt limit imposed by 
Maastrict Treaty) – borrowed money almost at the same interest rate as Germany which was 
sounder and relatively more competitive than the majority of the Eurozone economies of the 
Southern  Europe.  Second,  it  was  noticed  the  Eurosystem  inelasticity  to  risk  regarding 
Eurozone  governments  bonds:  NCBs  &  ECB  accepted  as  collateral  all  debt  securities  of 
Eurozone countries, including risky debt securities issued by GIIPS
1 countries. Further, as we 
shall see in the following sections of the article, the Eurobonds and ot her proposed strategies 
to solve sovereign debt problems imply the obliteration of the differences between the more 
risky and less risky debt securities (i.e. GIIPS countries and non -GIIPS countries debt 
securities) and therefore easy access to new funds for highly indebt Eurozone governments. 
 
2. TARGET2 system and its role in sovereign debt crisis 
TARGET2
2 system is the interbank payment system for the real -time processing of 
cross-border transfers throughout the European Union.  
A recent theoretical controversy related to the operation of this system raises questions 
about the effects it produce in the Eurosystem. A detailed analysis of TARGET2 system is 
performed by the economist Peter Garber, in a special report of Deutsche Bank (Garber 2010) 
and resumed later by other economists and analysts, like Stefan Homburg, head of public 
finance Leibniz University of Hannover (Homburg 2012), Hans-Werner Sinn, President of the 
Ifo Institute for economic Research in Munich (Werner -Sinn & Wollmershaeuser 2012), 
Philipp Bagus (Bagus 2012) and others. Among the problematic effects that are reported 
regarding the TARGET2 system is the indirect monetization of government deficits and 
socialization of risk involved in the process (Bagus 2012). Stefan Homburg also stresses  that 
TARGET2 system led to a "liability union". He emphasized that it was not established from 
the outset the periodical adjustment of TARGET2 balance and that NCB and BCE accepted as 
collateral for loans without differentiation all Eurozone governments bonds. 
The  way  TARGET2  system  function  allows  any  of  the  Eurozone  countries  to 
automatically draw vast credit from the rest of Eurozone members  via ECB in the case of 
capital flight (Garber 2010). It permits basically unlimited financing of current account deficit 
and during the crisis it functioned as a hidden bailout mechanism for countries like Spain, 
Greece and other countries with high current account deficits (Homburg 2012, Werner-Sinn 
2012,  Bagus  2012).  TARGET2  debits  represent  debt  of  companies  and  governments 
TARGET2 accumulated imbalances between the banks in the Eurozone mainly in the context 
of the financial crises, given the fact that since 2007 interbank market did not functioned 
properly.  In  October  2012,  Germany  credit  via  TARGET2  system  was  719  billion  euros 
(while at the end of 2011 it attained 463 billion euros), Spain debit was 380 billion euros and 
Italy  debit,  266  billion  euro.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  financial  crisis, 
Eurosystem/TARGET2  net  balance  indicates  a  progressive  accumulation  of  claims  in 
particular  by  Germany,  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg  and  debits  by  countries  like  Spain, 
Italy, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Graphic 1). 
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Graphic 1  - TARGET2 Net Balance with the Eurosystem (bn €) 
 
Source: Euro Crisis Monitor, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrück 
University 
 
* DNLF = Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland  
**GIIPS = Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
 
Ph. Bagus (2012) illustrates the role of TARGET2 system in Eurozone public debt 
accumulation  and  trade  deficits  using  an  example:  a  Spanish  agent  buys  an  asset  from 
Germany (import). At the beginning, the trade deficit may be financed by loans from German 
banks to Spanish banks, but after some time the Spanish banks will run out of good collateral. 
The increasing government debts and also the over indebtedness of the private sector reduce 
the quality of Spanish debt as collateral. At some point, private investors do not want to 
continue to finance Spanish banks (and Spanish trade deficit) because they do not have any 
more  good  collateral.  Yet  by  TARGET2  system,  Spanish  banks  can  use  bad  collateral 
(Spanish) and refinance with the Bank of Spain, which accepts Spanish bonds as collateral for 
new loans. TARGET2 debits to the ECB increase. Risks are shifted to the Eurosystem and 
socialized. The trade deficit is financed  via TARGET2 through public central bank loans 
(Bagus 2012). 
General conditions and key factors involved in the way TARGET2 system contributed 
to the public debts accumulation and to the increase of trade deficits in GIIPS countries are 
the following: 
1.  Fractional reserve banking that allows bank credit creation directed toward crediting 
governments; 
2.  Inelasticity  to  risk  of  Eurosystem:  NCBs  &  ECB  accept  risky  debt  securities  as 
collateral for loans; 
3.  No date established for TARGET2 credit and debit to be settled as it is the case with 
FED in USA, for example; as a result credit and debits accumulates indefinitely. 
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3.  Strategies  and  Policy  Tools  Applied  or  Proposed  in  Order  to  Counter  the 
Eurozone Debt Crisis 
 
3.1. ECB Bond Buying 
ECB intervened on several occasions on the market, not only as a lender of last resort 
for banks in the Euro area but also for Eurozone governments on the brink of bankruptcy. 
Traditionally, the ECB did not buy government bonds directly, but this has changed when 
Eurozone  debt  crisis  erupted;  the  ECB  intervened  directly  in  order  to  reduce  the  cost  of 
refinancing the Eurozone highly indebt governments. The ECB has developed programs of 
direct bond purchase of Euro area countries in the period 2010-2012: 
  June 2009 - Covered Bond Purchase Programme: ECB bought bonds with a total 
nominal value of 60 billion euros, which will be held by ECB until maturity.  
  May 2010 - ECB launched Securities Markets Programme (SMP),  
  November 2011 - Covered Bond Purchase Programme 2, which aimed to buy till 
October 2012 bonds with a total nominal value of 40 billion euros.  
  August 2012 - Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)  
ECB  decision  to  implement  the  new  program  (OMT)  in  August  2012  was  not 
unanimous; the representatives of Germany expressed its opposition. The chief of German 
central bank, Jens Weidmann and German Finance Minister, Philipp Roesler, voiced their 
opposition to the ECB plan to buy bonds of troubled member of the Eurozone, arguing that it 
would reduce the willingness of these countries to implement reforms. 
The  consequences  of  the  ECB  financing  of  GIIPS  public  debt  are  synthetic 
summarized by Aloys Prinz and Hanno Beck (2012, p. 186), based on a simple theoretical 
model. In the model, member states are classified in two categories, GIIPS/non-GIIPS; bonds 
issued by Euro area countries are also classified as GIIPS bonds and non-GIIPS bonds; banks 
are key players investing in bonds issued by national states, but this model assumes that banks 
are no longer willing to purchase bonds of GIIPS countries (only to highlight the effects of 
GIIPS debt financing via ECB).   
Key issues related with ECB bond buying as a solution to solve GIIPS government 
debt problem are the following: 
  There is no negative feedback loop to limit debt dynamic; therefore ECB balance will 
be overloaded with GIIPS bonds and ECB will incur losses, requiring recapitalization. 
There is also a major risk that ECB – trying to avoid a major crisis – to be entirely 
taken in tow by the fiscal policy of GIIPS countries (Prinz and Beck 2012, 186). 
  Highly  indebt  countries  will  have  access  to  funds  easier  then  would  normally  be 
possible on the market. This fact will lower the pressure for GIIPS countries to reform 
inefficient state sectors and inflexible labor markets. 
  ECB bond buying implies shifting the risks from the level of over indebt countries to 
the level of the entire Eurozone – which raise a moral hazard problem. The over indebt 
countries  not  only  that  will  not  have  an  incentive  to  reform  labor  market  and 
inefficient economic sectors or institutions  but they will have incentives to continue 
the deficit spending and public debt accumulation. 
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3.2. Eurobonds and EFSF/ESM Leverage   
Eurobonds are debt securities issued in euros jointly by the 17 Eurozone nations.  
Their role is to facilitate access to new funds in more advantageous conditions than would be 
the  case  on  the  market  for  highly  indebted  Eurozone  countries.  In  November  2011,  EC 
published the European Commission Green Paper on the Feasibility of Introducing Stability 
Bonds (EC 2011), proposing three main approaches for the issuance of Eurobonds, based on 
the degree of substitution of national issuance (full or partial) and also based on the nature of 
the underlying guarantee (joint and several/or several): 
1.  Full Eurobonds with joint liability. This option requires the complete replacement of 
the national issuance of governmental bonds by Eurobonds, each EU member being 
fully liable for the entire issuance.  
2.  Partial Eurobonds with joint liability. The second option implies that the member 
states  would  still  issue  national  bonds  to  cover  the  share  of  their  debts  beyond  a 
certain percentage of GDP not covered by Eurobonds.  
3.  Partial  Eurobonds  without  joint  guarantees.  The  third  option  implies  also  that 
member states would still issue national bonds to cover the share of their debts but 
without joint guarantees. Unlike the first two approaches, this would involve "several 
but not joint" government guarantees. 
Eurobonds are not an acceptable solution for the indebted Eurozone states, because on 
the long term it leads to progressive accumulation of public debts (Prinz and Beck 2012, p. 
188). Also, easy access to new funds for highly indebted countries may imply a moral hazard 
problem: transferring the costs of imprudent policies of GIIPS countries on other countries 
that have had a more restrictive fiscal policy creates strong incentives for all countries (GIIPS 
or non-GIIPS) to rely more on borrowing, increasing their public debts. Since the costs and 
risks  of  imprudent  policies  of  national  states  are  constantly  redistributed  to  all  Eurozone 
member states, there is no negative feedback loop for limiting the debt spiral in Eurozone 
(Prinz and Beck 2012, 188). 
EFSF leverage means that EFSF could buy GIIPS and non-GIIPS debt securities and 
then it could use them as collateral for ECB credit. The proposal was made in November 
2011, after the euro summit that was held in October 2011. There is a similarity between the 
proposal to issue Eurobonds and the EFSF/ESM leverage proposal. In both cases GIIPS states 
are not directly dependent on loans given by banks but instead they are financed by a publicly 
guaranteed agency. Also in the case of Eurobonds, debt securities of GIIPS and non-GIPS 
countries are treated as involving the same risk; in the case of leverage of EFSF/ESM, the 
differences between the debt securities of GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries is kept, but it does 
not play a role because these securities can be equally used as collateral for ECB credit 
Regarding the ultimate consequences, there are no significant differences between the 
ECB  bonds  buying  of  GIIPS  countries,  on  the  one  hand  and  Eurobonds  and  EFSF/ESM 
leverage  on  the  other  hand.  In  all  mentioned  cases,  high-risk  securities  will  reach  ECB 
balance. The ECB will have to bear the losses and it will need a recapitalization. This will 
ultimately have a negative impact  on all Eurozone states.  According to Hanno Beck and 
Aloys  Prinz,  the  only  negative  feedback  loop  that  has  worked  so  far  in  limiting  debt 
accumulation  is  market  discipline  –  and  every  policy  that  loosens  this  market  discipline 
increases the likelihood of debt explosion (Prinz and Beck 2012, pp. 187-188). 
In summary, the key issues related to Eurobonds and EFSF/ESM leverage as strategies 
to solve Eurozone debt problem are: 
  Moral  hazard  problem:  since  there  is  no  mechanism  to  restrict  public  debt  in 
GIIPS  countries  in  an  enforceable  way,  these  countries  are  confronted  with 90 
 
incentives to borrow excessively either via Eurobonds or through the EFSF (Prinz 
and Beck 2012, pp. 187-188). 
  There is no negative feedback loop to limit debt dynamic. Hanno Beck and Aloys 
Prinz (2012, pp. 187-188) identified that in the case of Eurobonds and EFSF/ESM 
leverage there are three positive feedback loops encouraging excessive borrowing: 
(1) GIIPS countries are encouraged to continue excessive borrowing policy since 
in case of Eurobonds and EFSF/ESM leverage the difference between GIIPS and 
non-GIIPS debt securities doesn’t really matter; (2) the second positive feedback 
loop that cause debt accumulation is set in motion given the fact that Eurobonds 
and EFSF bonds are accepted as collateral for ECB credit; (3) the third positive 
feedback loop will be put in motion in the case when ECB incurs losses and needs 
recapitalization  from  the  part  of  all  remained  solvent  countries  (non-GIIPS 
countries). 
 
3.3. Euro-TARP 
Euro-TARP (European Troubled Asset Relief Programme) requires using EFSF/ESM 
funds in order to recapitalize banks holding GIIPS bonds in their balance. It is a solution 
focused on saving banks than saving countries from default. With the Euro-TARP critical 
banks will be recapitalized so that they will be able to write-down the sovereign-debt of 
GIIPS countries without risking too low equity ratios. Aloys Prinz and Hanno Beck believe 
that the main advantage of Euro-TARP (unlike ECB bond buying, Eurobonds and EFSF/ESM 
leverage) is that ECB will be isolated from the debt crisis problem of GIIPS states (Prinz and 
Beck 2012, p. 188). 
The main weakness of this proposal is that it involve a transfer of funds from the non-
GIIPS countries to GIIPS countries, which means that losses will ultimately be supported by 
the  states  which  have  led  a  relatively  more  prudent  fiscal  policy  (more  exactly  by  the 
taxpayers of these states).  Although in the case of Euro-TARP will be isolated from debt 
crisis (or not affected to the same extent), this strategy does not differ essentially from other 
types of proposed solutions – ECB bonds buying, Eurobonds, EFSF/ESM leverage – because 
all  of  them  involve  socialization  risks  associated  with  the  accumulation  of  new  debts. 
Moreover, the necessary funds EFSF/ESM must provide to banks will lead ultimately to an 
increase of tax burden for Eurozone countries, with all negative economic effects that are 
following from this kind of policies.  
Aloys Prinz and Hanno Beck admit that without sovereign default, the recapitalization 
of banks will not work, because banks (and investors) will have the power to force their own 
bailout by attacking default-threatened countries and demanding high risk premiums so that 
the respective countries will become unable to refinance their maturing debt at affordable 
interest rates (Prinz and Beck 2012, p. 188).  
In fact, by accepting from the outset, as a solution, the discipline that market naturally 
impose – i.e. agents undertaking risky business, whatever their role, to fully support the risks 
and  losses  involved  without  appeal  to  any  mechanism  or  strategy  of  risk  and/or  loss 
socialization – would drastically reduce moral hazard and irresponsible or reckless behavior 
of  investors,  bankers  and  even  governments.  In  the  absence  of  various  bailout  options, 
governments will have to remain credible on the bond market. 
 
Key issues related to Euro-TARP strategy are the following: 
  Main advantage: ECB will not be involved in GIIPS public debt problem. 
  Main weakness: the recapitalization of banks is a form of socializing risk and losses 
and it will lead ultimately to an increase of fiscal burden in Eurozone countries that 
sustain EFSF or ESM with funds. 91 
 
  Sovereign default is required if recapitalization of banks is implemented otherwise the 
banks will have incentives to attack default-threatened countries in order to gain high 
risk premium and to force their own bailout. 
  If  market  discipline  is  accepted  from  the  beginning  for  all  kind  of  agents  and 
everybody (including banks) would be responsible for the risks and losses involved in 
their businesses banks themselves will be very cautious in investing in high risk debt 
securities. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The underlying institutional setup of the Eurozone is such that the costs of increasing 
deficits  and  public  debts  in  one  country  can  be  externalized  to  the  entire  Eurozone. 
Consequently there are clear incentives for Eurozone governments to permanently increase 
their deficit spending, as the cost of this increase is supported by all other countries using 
euro.  There  are  identifiable  general  conditions  and  features  of  Eurozone  institutions  that 
intentionally or not favored the process of debt accumulation. Thus, given the practice of 
fractional reserve banking and bank credit creation and also, given the peculiar institutional 
setup of Eurozone (one currency and many fiscal authorities), the costs of increasing the 
deficit in one of the Eurozone countries is undertaken by all users of euro currency in the 
form of reduced purchasing power of the monetary unit. The inelasticity to risk of Eurosystem 
– i.e. the fact that GIIPS and non-GIIPS debt securities are equally accepted as collateral by 
ECB  and  NCBs  for  credit  –  encouraged  highly  indebt  governments  to  continue  deficit 
spending and weakened the willingness  of these countries  to  reform  inefficient economic 
sectors. Also  the fact  that imbalances  arising from  TARGET2 operations  can accumulate 
indefinitely without settlement aggravated the public debt problem of Eurozone countries, 
especially after 2008 financial crisis. 
Moreover, most of the strategies advanced in order to solve the sovereign debt crisis in 
the  Euro  area  (in  the  context  of  a  fiscal  union  or  not)  –  ECB  bond  buying,  EFSF/ESM 
leverage, Eurobonds,  Euro-TARP  – involve additional mechanisms  and strategies of debt 
rollover and socialization of risks and losses. Whether or not a fiscal union would be set up, 
the debt problem will remain unsolved if all these mechanisms of risk socialization persist. In 
other  words,  if  a  fiscal  union  will  be  set  up  in  EU  without  dismantling  all  intrinsic 
mechanisms of debt accumulation and risk socialization, we will still be talking of the debt 
problem of the fiscal union member states.  
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